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This article looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the poli-
cies proposed in the Argentine National Multi-year Science and
Technology Plan, 1998-2000, within the conceptual framework
of the National Innovation System (NIS) approach. In the light
of a severe diagnosis of the weaknesses of Argentine efforts in
this field, the new public policies are designed to promote the
interaction of the many agents and institutions involved in those
efforts, to change the rules governing the allocation of public
resources to research, to promote strategic plans and evaluation
mechanisms in public bodies in this field, and to induce greater
voluntary spending by the private sector through fiscal credits
for technological research and development and a Technologi-
cal Advisers Programme, in order to give better attention to the
demands of small and medium-sized enterprises. However,
there are very profound and severe shortcomings in the ability
of the Argentine financial system to provide finance for long-
term investments in intangible assets, in the capacity of the
educational system to link up with the needs of the production
sector, and in the ability of the scientific institutions to interact
with the educational system and the production sector. Although
these shortcomings  are mentioned in the Plan, they are not
given the amount of attention needed to begin to reverse them.
The long and frustrating past history of science and technology
policies in the country, which have registered more failures than
successes, and the partial success of the laissez-faire policy ap-
plied in the 1990s, which was considered to be a good policy by
most of domestic and foreign big business, militate against the
success of the initiatives under way. At the same time, and in
spite of its stimulating suggestions, the approach taken by the
NIS reflects serious ambiguities in its normative and conceptual
aspects which limit its practical applicability.








In December 1997, the government Science and
Technology Cabinet (GACTEC) approved the National
Multi-year Science and Technology Plan 1998-2000
(Argentina, GACTEC, 1997), hereinafter referred to as
the Plan, whose central objective is no less than “the
development and strengthening of the national sci-
ence, technology and innovation system” (Argentina,
GACTEC, 1997). This was the first time in Argentina
that the National Innovation System (NIS) approach
was put forward at the official level, and the fact that
a science and technology plan was prepared was also
almost a novelty.1
The Plan was the result of a series of institutional
changes initiated in July 1996, when the Department
of Science and Technology was once again brought
under the Ministry of Culture and Education and the
reorganization of the science and technology sector
was begun.
After an intensive debate which was reflected in
the document entitled “Bases for the discussion of a
science and technology policy”, prepared by a hun-
dred or so experts, at the end of the year GACTEC was
set up, to be chaired by the Head of the Cabinet of
Ministers and made up of the Ministers of the econ-
omy, education, health, foreign relations and defence,
and natural resources and sustainable development.
The Department of Science and Technology acts as
the executive secretariat of GACTEC.
The National Agency for the Promotion of Science
and Technology (hereinafter called “the Agency”) was
also set up at the end of 1996, to be responsible ex-
clusively for financing non-profit-making research
projects in the public and private sector and promot-
ing technological innovation in the private sector.
In October 1997, GACTEC prepared the Plan, which
was submitted along with the draft national budget
for 1998 and simultaneously thrown open for public
discussion.
This dynamism is in sharp contrast with the
laissez-faire with regard to technology policy  (and
also to some extent scientific policy) displayed not
only by the Menem government up to 1996 but also
by the preceding Argentine governments, both civil
and military (for details of the situation in this respect
in the 1960s and 1970s, see Adler, 1987).2
Whereas up to 1990 laissez-faire was practiced
fundamentally by omission and in macroeconomic
situations which were not very favourable to growth,
we argued in a previous paper that under the present
administration laissez-faire has been applied as part
of orthodox economic theory, as a mainstream eco-
nomic approach (Chudnovsky and López, 1995).
Such theory considers science and technology basi-
cally as exogenous variables3 and, in general, adheres
to the policy recommendations of the so-called Wash-
ington Consensus (Williamson, 1990), which gives
priority to trade liberalization, privatization of public
enterprises and the promotion of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) as the fundamental instruments for se-
curing the technological modernization of developing
countries.
According to the mainstream economic ap-
proach, opening up the economy to imports would
stimulate  an  improvement in the efficiency of  the
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 7 • A P R I L 1 9 9 9158
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEM IN ARGENTINA  DANIEL CHUDNOVSKY
 This is a revised version of the study prepared for the OAS-
MCT (Brazil) project “Globalization and local innovation: Case
studies of  local systems  within MERCOSUR and proposals for
science  and technology policies”. The author  wishes to thank
Juan Carlos Del Bello and Jorge Katz for their comments on a
preliminary version, without of course associating them in any
way with the views expressed herein. The data used were those
available at the beginning of 1998; the National Multi-year
Science and Technology Plan 1999-2001, which is due to appear
shortly, will provide updated data and policy descriptions.
1 The only precedent goes back to 1971, when the Secretariat of
the National Council for Science and Technology prepared  a
National Science and Technology Plan, 1971-1975.
2 The most outstanding exceptions to this historical trend were in
the second half of the 1950s, when the authorities of the time set
up the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA), the Na-
tional Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA), the National
Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI), and the National Coun-
cil for Scientific and Technological Research (CONICET); in the
period between 1969 and 1975, when the National Council for
Science and Technology was set up and laws were adopted on
the transfer of technology; and to a much smaller extent in 1984-
1989, when a policy on informatics was proposed and the Office
for the Transfer of Technology was set up in CONICET, together
with some other initiatives (Chudnovsky and López, 1995).
3 Only in  recent  years  has technological  change  begun to be
incorporated as an endogenous variable in economic growth
models (e.g., in the works of Paul Romer).
productive sector through the greater competition on
the local market, while at the same time it would
facilitate access to the latest machinery and equipment,
whose importation was favoured by the zero tariff in
force until a little while ago in Argentina. The privatiza-
tion of public enterprises would not only make them
more efficient in the provision of goods and services but
also, through the elimination of the “Buy National”
clauses, it would give rise to greater competition among
their own suppliers.
Liberalization of the rules on FDI, for its part,
would promote the incorporation and dissemination
of the technical and management know-how of for-
eign investors. The deregulation of technology trans-
fer agreements would be a further stimulus for the
technological modernization process.
Among the various policies adopted by the present
administration, these policies have undoubtedly been
those which have had the greatest impact on the tech-
nological modernization of the country. In an econ-
omy with stable prices and a rapid growth rate, a big
increase in imports of capital goods and FDI inflows,
together with the substantial rise in the productivity
of labour in the 1990s, would appear to bear witness
to the success of the policies applied.
However, the fact that a large part of the production
apparatus has had great difficulty in coming closer to
international best technological practices and that, in
spite of the increase in expenditure on science and
technology in the 1990s,4 the crisis in the public insti-
tutions responsible for these activities prevents them
from defining their objectives and research priorities
as a function of the economic and social demands of
the country, reflects the marginal role of endo-
genous scientific and technological efforts in the
current policies.
The growing spread of non-orthodox theoretical
approaches among those responsible for defining
technology policy in the member countries of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has created a favourable setting for the adop-
tion of views on the problems of technological mod-
ernization and policies for  furthering  it which are
considerably different from  those advocated in the
mainstream economic approach and the Washington
Consensus.5
Since, in the case of the complex phenomena of
the acquisition, adaptation and development of technol-
ogy, markets either do not exist or suffer from serious
faults, the transmission of information and knowledge
is imperfect and enterprises act with only limited ra-
tionality. Public policies have an important role to play
in this field, especially with respect to small and me-
dium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are those that
have the greatest difficulty in adapting to the new com-
petition conditions.
Furthermore, while the importation of machinery
and equipment and the inflow of FDI facilitate techno-
logical modernization and the codifiable aspects of
technological know-how give rise to commercial
transactions, this process also generates a series of
positive externalities and synergies which are not ex-
pressed through the market and may require coordi-
nation and promotion agencies at the national and
local government level, which obviously means
abandoning the principle of laissez-faire.
This view of the problem had already been pro-
moted by some  officials  of the  present  government
through isolated initiatives such as Law No. 23877 on
the Promotion and Development of Technological Inno-
vation, adopted in 1990 and provided with the corre-
sponding regulatory mechanism in 1992, and the
Technological Modernization Programme, co-financed
with the Inter-American Development Bank, which
came into effect in 1994. With the recent institutional
changes and the application of the National Science and
Technology Plan (“the Plan”), official status has been
given to an active and, in principle, much better coordi-
nated policy in this field.
The dynamic approach recently displayed by the
government in this field is undoubtedly a promising
development, because it seeks to make a start on re-
versing the profound crisis suffered by the main pub-
lic institutions and bodies responsible for science and
technology and to stimulate the private sector to
make a bigger effort in this area. In view of this, the
present article aims to analyse the main policies pro-
posed in the Plan and to identify their strengths and
weaknesses  from the standpoint  of the conceptual
framework provided by the National Innovation
System approach.
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4 Expenditure on  science and  technology,  as  a percentage  of
GDP, went up from around 0.33% in 1985-1990 to 0.40% in
1994 and 0.46% in 1996 (Argentina, GACTEC, 1997).
5 Although Williamson (1997) has modified some of the original
recommendations of the Washington Consensus, especially with
regard to exchange-rate policy and the way trade liberalization
should be carried out, the problems of technology policy are not
dealt with in the new recommendations.
II
The conceptual framework
In the mainstream approach, intangible technology is
seen as a code of knowledge generated by the re-
search and development (R&D) departments of spe-
cialized firms. To a greater or lesser extent, these
departments  make use  of the scientific knowledge
generated in the universities and public R&D insti-
tutes.
According to the logic of the linear approach to
science and technology policy (OECD, 1992), which is
inspired in part by mainstream economics, the results
of public-sector R&D efforts spill down to users as
public goods. In private enterprises, innovative ef-
forts are generated in their R&D departments, from
which they spread internally to the production and
marketing departments and reach the market in the
form of product and process innovations.
To the extent that knowledge is codified, its
users can reproduce the respective instructions with-
out much difficulty. Technology would therefore be
an exogenous factor for most enterprises. If it were
privately owned, through patents or other mecha-
nisms, they could acquire it in the market by paying
royalties  or  other compensations. If it were freely
available, they would simply obtain it as technical
information.
In these types of approaches, the main objectives
of science and technology policy are to ensure a con-
tinuous flow of innovations –through adequate State
finance for the scientific and technological research
carried on in universities and public laboratories, pro-
tection for intellectual property, and fiscal incentives
for R&D expenditure by the private sector– and to
favour the dissemination of innovations throughout
the system of production by means of an efficient
information system, directed mainly at the SMEs.
Monopolistic conduct that might arise in the use of
intangible assets would be offset by policies designed
to protect competition.
In contrast with the approach taken by mainstream
economics, evolutionary or neo-Schumpeterian theories
consider that scientific and technological knowledge
is not perfectly codifiable, so that its transferability is
not perfect. Both the generation and the use of
knowledge require an endogenous effort based on
the accumulation of scientific, technical and organiza-
tional capacities, which gives rise to increases in pro-
ductivity and efficiency and, ultimately, the generation
of a growing flow of innovations with regard to prod-
ucts and production processes.
The notion  of  technological  capacities tries to
cover the wide range of knowledge and skills needed
in order to purchase, assimilate, use, adapt, change
and create technologies. This concept goes beyond
the traditional notions of engineering and technical
know-how, to include knowledge of both organiza-
tional procedures and structures and of patterns of
behaviour (of workers or clients, for example). Firms
need certain supplementary assets in order to create,
mobilize and improve their technological capacities,
including such assets as organizational flexibility,
financial resources, quality of human resources, and
sophisticated support and information services
(OECD, 1992).
The process of acquiring the scientific, technical
and organizational knowledge needed in order to use
the available technologies efficiently is long, risky
and unpredictable.  It  involves the  development of
technological and organizational capacities through
deliberate efforts of learning in the production proc-
ess (“learning by doing”), in marketing and contacts
with clients (“learning by using”) and in an ongoing
search for new technical solutions in R&D units or in
less formal places such as technical offices (“learning
by searching”). In addition to major in-house efforts,
this process involves  interacting  with suppliers of
equipment, parts and components, with licensors,
with  foreign  partners, with  technological  institutes
and universities, and with clients (“learning by inter-
acting”). It is a collective learning process in which,
although the epicentre consists of the manufacturing
enterprises themselves and the various sectors in
which they operate, other public and private actors
and institutions are also involved.
The tacit, localized and accumulative nature of
technological knowledge, the emphasis on the learning
process and the various sources underlying it, and the
importance of feedback and of the numerous interac-
tions which characterize and induce it, all go to make
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up a complex and constantly changing social setting
which is completely different from the simplified
scheme which the mainstream economic literature
uses to address these issues.
The numerous actors and institutions participating
in the innovation process and the importance of their
interaction in order to achieve a form of innovation
which bears fruit in terms of private and social benefits
have been effectively described in the neo-Schumpete-
rian literature through the concept of the national inno-
vation system.
The first definition of this system, suggested by
Freeman  (1988), identified it with the network of
public and private institutions whose activities and
interactions initiate, import, modify and disseminate
new  technologies. In a subsequent study, Freeman
says that  List was the first author to use that ap-
proach, although he gave it a different name (Free-
man, 1995). In the studies by Lundvall (1992), by
Nelson (ed., 1993) and by Edquist (ed., 1997), the NIS
is analysed from various angles and on the basis of
various different national experiences. At the same
time, the concept of the NIS has gradually been
spreading from the academic world to the world of
policy-makers, and it is being used in one form or
another both in OECD documents (OECD, 1992 and
1996b) and in those of a number of OECD member
countries.
In Edquist (1997) there is an excellent study of
the approach based on the NIS. In our opinion,
Edquist’s study is right in considering that this is not
a formal theory but rather a conceptual framework
for addressing the issues in question from a holistic,
interdisciplinary and historical (albeit  conceptually
vague) standpoint.
To put it briefly, the main point in an approach
based on the NIS is that it considers innovation and
learning as crucial aspects. Although enterprises are
the backbone of the NIS, they do not innovate alone.
Innovation is an interactive process, and in the final
analysis the approach stresses above all the impor-
tance of the interactions among the various different
actors and institutions that participate in the complex
collective  process. Unlike the linear model, which
placed emphasis essentially on the generation of in-
novations, the NIS approach places just as much or
even more stress on their dissemination.
Although different authors have somewhat dif-
fering views in this respect, the approaches based on
the NIS refer to greater or lesser innovations in prod-
ucts, processes and forms of organization. Further-
more, they do not only deal with innovations in the
countries that are on the leading edge of technology
but also in those following a strategy of trying to
catch up and keep up with the most advanced econo-
mies (Mytelka, 1996).
At the same time, these approaches try to get
away from the usual  dichotomy of addressing the
problem in the light of only two fundamental institu-
tions –the market and the State– and they also take
into account, among many other elements, universi-
ties, banks, intellectual property legislation, and tech-
nological research and services institutes.
Apart from the enormous difficulties involved in
trying to identify and quantify the various indicators
(in addition to R&D expenditure and the number of
patents taken out) that would give an idea of the level
of performance of an NIS, the weakest points in this
approach are connected with the relative weight of
inputs imported from abroad compared with endo-
genous efforts to absorb6 and generate innovations, and,
above all, with its normative aspects as regards the role
of public policies in forming NISs.
In a globalized economy where FDI grows faster
than international trade and the costs of the transmission
of information and transport are continually going
down, external flows of technological knowledge
take on growing importance. In so far as the knowl-
edge generated in processes of innovation is tacit,
accumulative and localized, however, there is a good
deal of room at the national and local level for the
development of endogenous technological capability.
Indeed, such capability is indispensable in order, at
the very least, to be able to efficiently absorb the
knowledge coming from the exterior and, obviously,
to be able to adapt, modify and generate new knowl-
edge.
In spite of the growing interdependence of the
industrialized countries as regards flows of invest-
ment and technology, the pilot studies on NISs carried
out in a number of OECD countries clearly indicate
that in those countries enterprises base their innova-
tion process essentially on their own R&D efforts and
make relatively little use of imported flows (OECD,
1996a).
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6 This fundamental issue is ignored in the study  by Edquist
(1997). In the footnote on page 44 of that study, however, the
author notes that in all countries except the economically largest
ones, this dissemination (of technology) mainly represents
absorption from the exterior. This is the case in Sweden as well
as in Mexico and India.
In contrast, most of the developing countries
generally display the opposite situation. Not only are
the resources allocated to R&D by the private sector
relatively scanty, but enterprises interact much more
with suppliers of technology from abroad than with
local firms or institutions. Furthermore, the links are
generally in only one direction (licenses, franchises,
subcontracting) and there are few two-way agreements
regarding R&D, production or marketing (following the
classification proposed by Mytelka, 1992).
Moreover, in the case of the Asian countries
which have successfully followed strategies aimed at
catching up with the most advanced countries in this
respect it may be noted that although efforts to absorb
technologies from abroad have been a generalized
feature of their industrialization strategies, the chan-
nels used have differed considerably from one coun-
try to another, as have the industrial sectors selected
in the different stages of their strategies (Mowery,
1993; Lall, 1992).
The opinions of different authors regarding the
role of public policies in the formation of NISs vary
considerably. Whereas Nelson and Rosenberg con-
sider that NISs evolve spontaneously and are thus not
designed in a deliberate manner, other authors main-
tain that the State has an important role to play in
their formation. Edquist’s position seems the most
plausible: some elements of the NIS do evolve sponta-
neously, but others are the subject of deliberate public
policies. This author also considers that the NIS ap-
proach is useful for policy formulation in so far as it
provides an analytical framework for the identifica-
tion of specific policy issues which is different from
that resulting from the application of orthodox eco-
nomics.
However, the NIS approach does not generate
very precise normative elements for policy formula-
tion. Authors like Nelson and Dahlman would appear
to be basically in agreement with the recommenda-
tions of the Washington Consensus regarding the
positive role of FDI and trade openness, though they
supplement them with horizontal policies designed to
increase technological capability and the capacity for
the social absorption of knowledge (Dahlman and
Nelson, 1993). In contrast, other authors such as
Freeman and, above all, Lall seem to assign much
more importance to selective policies on industrial
and technological matters (Lall, 1995).
With regard to the late-industrializing countries,
there can be no doubt that first of all the experience
of Japan and later that of the “Asian Tigers” has been
a source of inspiration on what relatively successful
NISs should be like. Although this inspiration is
clearly visible in the works of Freeman (1988 and
1995) and Lall (1992 and 1995), however, it is much
less evident in the studies by Nelson.
As noted by David and Foray (1995), from the
social point of view it is important that an NIS should
have “distributive power” in order to facilitate the
efficient distribution  and use  of the  scientific and
technological  knowledge available in society. This
view assumes that the same means used to ensure
greater private profitability of  innovative activities
may reduce the distributive power of the NIS. Conse-
quently, there may be a conflict between “appropri-
ability”, which would favour greater accumulation of
new knowledge, and “distributive power”, which
would help to ensure that such knowledge was more
socially “useful”.
Hence, in the case of the industrialized countries,
the OECD has rightly noted that the dilemma for pub-
lic policies is that they have to reconcile two main
objectives. On the one hand, they must develop an
environment with abundant incentives, so that the ex-
pected private benefits are substantial and motivate
enterprises to generate increasing amounts of innova-
tions. These incentives should not only consist of tax
deductions for R&D expenditure and protection of
intellectual  property but  should also extend  to the
financing of pre-competitive research, the promotion
of strategic alliances, and public sector purchases,
among other aspects.
On the other hand, public policies must promote
numerous spillover effects, so that firms only appro-
priate a part of the benefits of innovation and its so-
cial profitability is maximized. This involves a
number of actions including not only the defence of
competition but also measures to promote linkages
among enterprises and between enterprises, universities
and research institutes at the regional level; the provi-
sion of advisory and consultancy services for SMEs; the
operation of enterprise brooders, and training and re-
training programmes for technical and management
staff (OECD, 1992 and 1997).
To sum up, although the NIS approach is concep-
tually vague, it is undoubtedly useful for addressing and
analysing the problems of innovation in developed and
developing countries.  It identifies  the most  important
agents and institutions that must be taken into account
when forming NISs, and it is flexible enough to adapt
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to the various different historical and institutional
situations. Although it does suggest the areas where
public policies should act and generally rejects the
idea of laissez-faire, however, it does not make any
specific recommendations about the policies that
should be followed.
III
The new science and technology
policies in Argentina
1. The diagnosis
Although it does not go into the underlying causes,
the Plan makes a searching diagnosis of the Argen-
tine situation with regard to science and technology.
In general terms, we agree with this diagnosis, which
is summarized below.
First, the noteworthy recent growth of the Ar-
gentine economy (almost 6% per year on average be-
tween  1990 and 1996) and of labour productivity
(47% between 1990 and 1996)7 has been based on
machinery, inputs and knowledge mainly brought in
from the exterior. The data on imports of capital
goods, foreign direct investment and patents clearly
illustrate this.
Imports of machinery and equipment increased
from US$635 million to US$6037 million between
1990 and 1994, went down by 20% in 1995, but registered
an upward trend again in 1996 and 1997.8 FDI flows
increased from an annual average of US$2.7 billion
in 1990-1993, when they corresponded mainly to the
acquisition of State enterprises, to US$3.8 billion in
1994-1996, when industry, mining and some services
were the main recipients. Patent applications submit-
ted in Argentina by non-residents increased from
1955   in   1990   to   4012 in   1996. After having
amounted to over 1000 per year in the 1980s and over
900 per year in the early 1990s, patent applications by
residents went down to less than 700 in 1994 and 1995,
recovering to 1097 in 1996. Argentine residents take out
hardly any patents abroad.
Consequently, it is noted in the Plan that the sig-
nificant economic growth process in the 1990s has
generated few opportunities for making use of the
country’s stock of human resources. It has left out a
large part of the SMEs, which have displayed serious
difficulties in adapting to the new rules of the Argentine
economy, and it has not generated sufficient incentives for
the big firms to make systematic research, development
and innovation efforts.
As may be seen from table 1, private-sector ex-
penditure on science and technology is completely
out of line with international levels. It is estimated at
0.13% of GDP, which is far below the levels not only
of the industrialized countries (over 1%) but even of
Chile and Brazil (0.27% and 0.18%, respectively).
Although a large part of the inputs for product
and process innovation come from abroad, it may be
assumed that the more intensive competition registered in
the Argentine economy in recent years is giving rise to
sizeable endogenous innovation activities and technologi-
cal efforts to absorb and adapt this knowledge. Thus, it is
estimated that, altogether, companies have increased their
R&D expenditure, in constant 1996 pesos, from 214
million in 1993 to 369 million in 1996 (i.e., from
0.08% to 0.13% of GDP).9
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7 According to official information, labour productivity in indus-
try grew by 58% (6.8% per year) between 1990 and the first half
of 1997, whereas in the 1980s it grew by an average of only
0.8% per year (CEP, 1997).
8 Gross fixed domestic investment increased from 13.4% to
23.6% of GDP between 1990 and 1994. The investment coeffi-
cient went down to 20.7% in 1995 but recovered in 1996
(21.5%) and is estimated to have amounted to 25% of GDP in
1997. Within this investment, the share of imported capital
goods increased from 13% in the first quarter of 1991 to 40% in
the first quarter of 1997, while  the share of domestic capital
goods went down from 20% to 12% over the same period
(Argentina, Ministry of the Economy and Public Works and
Services, Economic Policy Department, 1997).
9 As it may be assumed that this estimate does not take into
account all the innovation efforts which are probably being made
in most large foreign-owned and national firms and in small and
medium-sized enterprises, the Department of Science and Tech-
nology is carrying out a survey on the technological conduct of
Argentine industrial enterprises, through the National Institute of
Statistics and Censuses (INDEC).
At all events, regardless of the actual size of the
corresponding investment, the Plan rightly notes that
the private sector efforts are generally of a short-term
nature, do not include systematic scientific and tech-
nological research activities, are not linked up with
public science and technology institutions, and are
not carried out in networks with active participation
of suppliers, users and clients. In short, they are far
from having the scale required in order to tackle the
challenges involved in the formation of an NIS.
Second,  Argentina is at a clear disadvantage
compared with the industrialized countries and
South Korea, though it is relatively better off than
Mexico, Brazil and Chile in terms of the proportion
of researchers in relation to the economically ac-
tive population (table 2). In contrast with what oc-
curs in the industrialized countries and South
Korea, almost all the research personnel work in na-
tional public sector bodies, including CONICET, and in
national universities.
Although Argentina has highly-trained human
resources and some of its scientific researchers and
research groups have won worldwide recognition for
their contributions (Argentina is the only country in
the region which has several Nobel science prizewin-
ners), it is impossible to overlook the ageing of the
research staff and the scanty relative development
of many scientific disciplines. As may be seen
from table 2, the productivity of scientific research,
as measured by the number of papers published in
international reviews, is not very high compared with
the industrialized countries.10 Nevertheless, it is
higher than that of a number of developing countries,
including South Korea. At the same time, there has
been a disturbing relative decline in the number of
students studying fundamental and applied science
(from 40% in 1986 to 33% in 1996).
Furthermore, the interaction of the educational
sector with the scientific and technological sectors
and above all with the production sector is still very
limited. Teaching has few links with research, and the
research efforts in  the  universities  have  few links
with each other and with the needs of the production
sectors.
Third, public sector expenditure on science and
technology represented only 0.33% of GDP in 1996,
which is very little by international standards (see
table 1). Moreover, it is estimated that in 1996 fun-
damental research accounted for 28% of this total,
applied research for 50% and experimental develop-
ment for 22%. This structure is very different from
that of the industrialized countries, where experimen-
tal development accounts for about two-thirds of the
total and fundamental and applied research account
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TABLE 1
International comparison of investment in science and technology a
Total investment in
science and technology Government and othersb Enterprises
Country
Millions % of GDP Millions % of GDP Millions % of GDP
of US$ of US$ of US$
United States 184 300 2.48 66 822 0.87 117 478 1.53
Japan 76 004 2.78 22 573 0.82 53 431 1.96
Germany 37 149 2.48 14 785 0.99 22 363 1.49
France 26 721 2.38 11 788 1.05 14 933 1.33
South Korea 12 200 2.69 3 282 0.72 8 918 1.97
Spain 4 376 0.92 2 464 0.52 1 912 0.40
Brazil c 5 888 0.87 4 107 0.61 1 850 0.27
Mexico c 1 114 0.33 1 039 0.31 75 0.02
Argentina c 1 353 0.46 984 0.33 369 0.13
Chile c 398 0.78 310 0.60 88 0.18
Source: Argentina, GACTEC (1997).
a Last available year.
b Includes non-profit-making institutions and private higher education.
c Corresponds to total expenditure on science and technology, which covers more than expenditure on research and development.
10 It is hard to determine from the available information whether
the productivity of scientific research in Argentina is rather low
because of the scarcity or faulty allocation of funds or because a
number of the researchers shown in the records are not actually
engaged in research.
for relatively much smaller proportions than in Ar-
gentina.
Finally, in the public sector bodies there is a lack
of priorities, serious shortcomings in management,
lack of coordination and of quality evaluation mecha-
nisms, and serious imbalances in budgetary alloca-
tion. Thus, 72% of the national budget in this area is
concentrated in four institutions: the national univer-
sities, CONICET, the National Institute of Agroindus-
trial Technology (INTA), and the National Atomic
Energy Commission (CNEA). The weight of the latter
institution in the national budget is a clear reflection
of the high priority given to nuclear energy in the
past. In contrast, although the manufacturing sector
generates 25% of GDP, the National Institute of In-
dustrial Technology (INTI) receives less than 5% of
the national science and technology budget. Further-
more, in a federal country like Argentina the prov-
inces receive practically no share of the public
finance for scientific and technological activities.
Although the evaluation of public sector activi-
ties in this field is a task which has only recently been
begun, it is known that most of the activities carried
out at present are of a short-term nature, even though
there are institutions which have shown that they are
capable of carrying out long-term scientific and tech-
nological development projects. Lack of coordination
among the programmes of the different organizations,
lack of precise objectives and evaluation mecha-
nisms, and concentration on the provision of routine
services and technical assistance are the most notable
features of public sector scientific and technological
activities.
It is evident that the science and technology ef-
fort of the public sector –and even more so that of
private firms– is not only clearly insufficient but is
also uncoordinated, is mostly not designed to meet
the needs of the production sector in general and the
SMEs in particular, and does not generate the syner-
gies called for in the NIS approach.
When trying to understand how and why the pre-
sent situation has been reached, it is necessary to take
into account the long and complicated prior history of
the scientific and technological institutions, the char-
acteristics assumed by the industrialization process,
the role played in it by public and private enterprises
and the scientific community itself, and also the ac-
tions of the Argentine State, but this task is outside
the scope of the present article.11 The main responsi-
bility belongs to the national government, however,
and we will therefore deal primarily with recent insti-
tutional changes and with the policies adopted in
order to begin to change the situation identified in
the diagnosis.
2. Recent institutional changes
In the course of its history, the Department of Sci-
ence and Technology has come under various higher
bodies, most frequently the Office of the President of
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TABLE 2
Number of researchers in science and technology
and papers published in international reviews a
Number of Number of Number ofNumber of Researchers/ papers published
Country researchers EAP (annual average papers per papers published/
1992-1995) researcher EAP
b
United States 962 700 7.4 253 347 0.26 20.27
United Kingdom 140 000 5.0 51 840 0.37 18.51
Germany 240 802 5.7 47 036 0.20 11.20
France 129 780 4.9 37 107 0.29 14.27
Spain 41 681 2.8 13 698 0.33 9.13
Argentina 22 147 1.9 2 306 0.11 1.92
Brazil 37 300 0.7 4 415 0.12 0.75
Mexico 19 434 0.6 2 254 0.16 0.68
Chile 6 429 1.3 1 228 0.19 2.46
South Korea 98 764 4.9 1 108 0.01 0.55
Source: Argentina, GACTEC (1997).
a Last available year.
b Per 100 000 members of the economically active population (EAP).
11 For an analysis of this matter, see Chudnovsky and López
(1995).
the Nation and the Ministry of Education. However,
it was never able to effectively fulfill the coordina-
tion and planning function originally assigned to it.
Consequently, the science and technology institutions
have generally been left to their own devices or to the
logic of the sector with which they were most closely
related.
As from July 1996, the Department has formed
part of the Ministry of Culture and Education.12 Its
political function and its coordination and planning
functions have taken on greater importance since the
establishment of GACTEC as a mechanism for dealing
with scientific and technological issues in the most
important ministries, and because of its responsibility
in the formulation of the Plan. An Inter-agency Ac-
tion Commission has also been set up, made up of all
the national public sector science and technology
bodies (except the universities).
In addition, in order to involve the provinces in
the setting of regional priorities, the Federal Council
for Science and Technology (COFECYT) has been es-
tablished, chaired by the Secretary for Science and
Technology and made up of the top officials respon-
sible for these matters in the 23 provinces and the
city of Buenos Aires.
Unlike the United States and various Latin
American countries, in Argentina there was no insti-
tution responsible exclusively for the promotion and
development of scientific research and/or technologi-
cal development, since CONICET is an executive
agency which also carries out functions of promotion
and development. Consequently, it was decided to set
up the National Agency for the Promotion of Science
and Technology.
As well as strengthening the promotion machin-
ery and making it accessible to all research groups,
regardless of the institution they belong to, the estab-
lishment of the Agency is designed to reorganize and
improve the coordination of the existing instruments.
For this purpose, it has two funds: FONCYT and
FONTAR.
FONCYT subsidizes the following activities
through public competitions: i) scientific and techno-
logical research projects (costing up to 25 000 pesos
per year) carried out by groups of researchers work-
ing in public  or  private non-profit-making institu-
tions; the results of these projects are to be published
a priori in open-circulation reviews; ii) research and
development projects whose results are a priori
public goods but may be subject to conditions of
confidentiality for commercial reasons, with the
sponsor having  priority for  their  acquisition;  these
projects (which may cost up to 1 200 000 pesos) are
concerted between the enterprise involved and the
non-profit-making institution carrying out the re-
search and must receive financing from the sponsor.
FONTAR finances technological innovation and
modernization projects whose results are appropri-
able and are designed to improve the competitiveness
of enterprises producing goods or services. This fund
brings together the various instruments for this pur-
pose which were previously dispersed, such as Law
No. 23 877 and the IDB Technological Modernization
Programme. The clients of FONTAR are innovative en-
terprises   and also non-profit-making institutions
wishing to obtain better equipment in order to im-
prove their capacity to provide technical assistance to
the private sector.
The conception, formulation and public discus-
sion of the Plan represent an important institutional
change. The Plan is basically a programme of work
marked by its flexibility, which allows it to incorpo-
rate new policy initiatives each year, and by its mul-
tidimensional nature, since it covers both horizontal
policies and sectoral, regional and thematic policies.
In view of the lack of coordination and planning
of science and technology efforts and the conflicts of
interest which may arise in institutions that are re-
sponsible both for executing projects and for promot-
ing research, these changes not only involve a healthy
dose of common sense but are also in keeping with
the direction suggested by the NIS approach. Natu-
rally, their virtues or defects will only be revealed in
the course of their practical execution, through the
policy measures indicated in the Plan.
3. The main policy measures and their effects
on the public sector
In order to begin to reverse the situation described
earlier, the Plan proposes that the national effort in
the field of science, technology and innovation
should be improved, augmented and made more effi-
cient by promoting a greater effort on the part of
the private sector and the provinces through the
co-financing of projects by private enterprises and
the provincial authorities.
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12 In addition to CONICET, the National Atomic Energy Com-
mission also comes under the Department of Science and Tech-
nology.
Instead of concentrating almost exclusively on
supply, as has traditionally been the case, the policies
proposed in the Plan aim to guide national and re-
gional efforts in the area of science, technology and
innovation as a function of the demands of the pro-
duction sector and the social and regional needs of
the country. At the same time, they are inspired by
the NIS approach and seek to promote better coordi-
nation and linkages among the public and private sec-
tor actors and institutions taking part in the process of
generating, disseminating and absorbing knowledge
and innovations.
The Plan is much more specific with regard to
horizontal policies than with respect to thematic, sec-
toral and regional policies, so we will concentrate on
the first-named. In this section we will refer to those
that fundamentally concern the public sector, while in
the following section we will deal with those that
seek to promote a process of innovation in the private
sector.
At all events, some comments are called for re-
garding sectoral, regional and thematic problems. As
the demand for science, technology and innovation
stems from the demand for the economic and social
goods and services that incorporate these factors, this
should be a central element of sectoral policies, as the
Plan document rightly asserts.
Whereas correct diagnoses have been made and
some appropriate policy measures have been outlined
in such activities as food and agriculture and mining,
this is far from having occurred in such important
sectors as the rest of manufacturing, the environment,
education and health. In this respect, the unequal de-
gree of preparation of sectoral priorities in the Plan is
a reflection of the levels of interest displayed by the
respective responsible authorities in the execution of
the task and, to a certain extent, the effectiveness of
GACTEC as a coordination and planning mechanism.
Be that as it may, it is worth bearing in mind
that, unlike what happened in the past, in the 1990s
the national government has shown little propensity
to formulate and implement sectoral policies, the
most noteworthy exceptions to this in the production
sector being the motor industry, mining and the
Spatial Organization Plan (although the latter is an
activity rather than a sector).
At the level of the regions, the Plan incorporates
the results of a Pilot Programme for the Identification
of Needs with regard to scientific and technological
applications  and knowledge, although these results
are far from constituting policy guidelines for guid-
ing the efforts of the provinces in the field of science
and technology and much less for forming regional
innovation systems.
Biotechnology and studies on the Argentine ma-
rine environment are the only two thematic areas
dealt with  in  the Plan. In the first of these areas,
research priorities are proposed and some activities
are suggested, such as the implementation of a sys-
tem for evaluating biotechnology projects and pro-
moting microenterprises and small-scale enterprises
through a system of enterprise brooders. In the sec-
ond, priorities are suggested for allocating the funds
of the Agency.
Although, among the horizontal policies pro-
posed in the Plan, some measures are suggested for
securing better access to information from satellites
and the Internet, no policies are proposed for the pro-
motion of endogenous efforts in the areas of micro-
electronics, informatics, telecommunications, or new
materials: generic technologies which are abundantly
referred to in most of the official documents on sci-
ence and technology in both industrialized and devel-
oping countries. In the 1999-2001 Plan, it has been
decided to place emphasis on the field of microelec-
tronics in order to try to concentrate on applications
in this area, in spite of the scanty interest displayed in
Argentina  in  these  generic technologies, except as
mere users.
The main horizontal policy measures for the
public sector are designed to increase the available
funds, to bring about changes in the management of
the respective bodies, and to change the manner of
allocating funds for research by introducing competi-
tive mechanisms.
The national budget for 1998 provided for a
12.6% increase in credit for public science and tech-
nology bodies (to 881 million pesos). This increase
benefited in particular the National Water and Envi-
ronment Institute (INA), INTA, INTI, the Argentine
Geological and Mining Service (SEGEMAR) and
CONICET.
At the same time, all bodies are required to for-
mulate strategic plans in which they must clearly
identify their institutional priorities, objectives, indi-
cators of results and impacts, and self-appraisal
mechanisms. It is proposed in the Plan that bodies
which have formulated Strategic Plans and Proposals
for Change in accordance with the guidelines of the
Multi-Year National Plan and which are subject to the
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process of external appraisal to be carried out in the
period 1998-2000 should be allowed more flexible
conditions of management than those currently ap-
plied, including, among other things, the possibility
of incorporating staff incentives based on the
achievement of goals and results. Such changes are
indispensable in order to establish greater links be-
tween the science and technology bodies and their
users and to encourage their scientific staff to partici-
pate in technological tasks.
What is sought is to set in motion a significant
process of restructuring of the public bodies in this
field, whose performance has been very uneven and
which, in general, lack goals and objectives defined
as a function of the new context in which the Argen-
tine economy and society are operating. Although it
is obviously too early to pass judgement on a process
which has only just been begun, both the complex
past history of the bodies and the budgetary difficul-
ties under which they have to operate, as well as the
unequal levels of political will that seem to exist in
GACTEC, shed doubts on the possibility of success in
such a complicated process.
It  is important to  acknowledge, however, that
INTI –one of the bodies whose functioning and or-
ganization we questioned in a detailed earlier study
(Chudnovsky and López, 1995)– seems to have be-
gun to overcome some of its past shortcomings by
defining its action in the new context better, changing
the generational profile of its staff, and strengthening
both its horizontal activities and the linkages of the
sectoral centres with users. Likewise, the National
Commission on Spatial Organization (CONAE) now
has a strategic plan which clearly defines its goals
and tasks, and it has been one of the few public
bodies which has effectively carried out auditing and
evaluation activities.
Together with the launching of this reform proc-
ess in the public science and technology bodies, part
of the funds available to the Agency will be allocated
to research projects put forward by these bodies (and
non-profit-making foundations) through competitive
mechanisms.
This means that, in addition to the funds they
receive from the national budget, these bodies will be
able to gain access to extra resources if the research
projects they present are favourably evaluated in terms
of their quality (judgement by their peers) and appro-
priateness (impact on economic and social develop-
ment and on the educational sector, and conformity
with the priorities laid down in the Plan).13 As the
projects subsidized by the Agency also have to be
co-financed by their executing bodies, by the private
sector and by the provinces, it is essential that the
extra funds should be allocated on a competitive ba-
sis and should back up the effects of public financing.
Although they are not very significant compared
with the national public sector budget, which, as we
already noted, amounts to 881 million pesos, the
funds that FONCYT will have at its disposal as from
1998 are by no means negligible. It will have a
budget of 36 million pesos, which, with the addi-
tional resources provided by the bodies executing the
projects, will increase to 44.5 million pesos. It is pro-
posed that FONCYT should allocate 75% of its
budget14 in line with the priorities laid down in the
Plan, with the remainder being allocated to research
projects in the other disciplines or subject areas.
With the aim of furthering the linkages which are
of central importance in the NIS approach, the Plan
provides that FONCYT will give priority to projects
tending to form research networks, presented jointly
by researchers from a given region, researchers from
different regions of  the country, or in conjunction
with institutions of other countries under the various
international cooperation agreements.
The introduction of competitive mechanisms for
the allocation of public funds for research is undoubt-
edly a major change in the rules and places a big
responsibility on the Agency, whose learning process
is only just beginning and whose decisions will affect
vested interests within the scientific community.
4. Measures directed towards the private sector
As well as promoting greater participation by enter-
prises in the research and development projects fi-
nanced by FONCYT, FONTAR will continue promoting
the existing credits, subject to compulsory repay-
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13 It is these resource allocation criteria which have given rise to
most resistance and heavy criticism of the Plan among important
segments  of the scientific community (such  as  the Forum  of
Argentine Scientific Societies), which would obviously prefer to
continue with the practices of the past in CONICET, since these
largely benefit their members.
14 In turn, this 75% will be distributed as follows: 25% for
projects on priority matters in the areas of health, education and
the environment; 25% for projects in the food and agriculture,
industrial and mining sectors, and 25% for projects reflecting
priorities agreed upon with the provinces.
ment, granted to enterprises through the Banco de la
Nación Argentina and the other financial instruments
at its disposal.15 At the same time, its performance
will be  strengthened  with the  launching of a pro-
gramme of technological advisers for SMEs and a fis-
cal credit mechanism for promoting greater efforts in
technological activities by private enterprise.
Although the unification of the various financial
instruments within FONTAR is a sensible decision, in
view of the experience of recent years it is hard to be
optimistic about the impact this can have on the tech-
nological modernization process of the SMEs.
Of the various instruments provided for in Law
No. 23 877 for the promotion of technological inno-
vation, it has only been possible to implement –and
even then in quite an erratic manner– the credits for
R&D projects presented by entrepreneurs or “techno-
logical linkage units”.16 These are credits at subsi-
dized interest rates which are granted directly by the
Science and Technology Department and require col-
lateral to guarantee their repayment. Between 1993
and 1997, 25 credits were granted in the country as a
whole for a total of 10.3 million pesos, with a total
investment of  16.3 million  pesos. The granting of
these credits has been displaying a downward trend,
going down from 13 in 1993 to 8 in 1996 and only
one in 1997. Apart from the problems that have
arisen in obtaining the necessary funds, a high pro-
portion (45%) of these credits have proved impossi-
ble to collect.
The compulsory repayment  credits granted by
the Banco de la Nación Argentina from its own funds
and those of the Inter-American Development Bank
are intended for relatively simple, low-risk techno-
logical modernization projects. Their maximum
amount is US$2 million, the interest rate is variable,
and real guarantees are required. From 1995 to the
present 29 credits have been granted to small and
medium-sized enterprises for a total of US$17.7
million, for total investments of US$48 million.
Although there is an upward trend in the grant-
ing of these credits, only a small number have been
granted so far, for various reasons: the high level of
indebtedness of the SMEs; the Banco de la Nación
Argentina’s requirement that real guarantees be
given; the limited experience of this bank in granting
loans other than those of a traditional nature intended
for fixed investments and the priority given to repay-
ment capacity in deciding whether to grant them or
not, and the impossibility of financing working capi-
tal and granting loans to new companies.
The fact that this bank is the only financial insti-
tution which has become involved in loans of this
type, in spite of its limited experience, is also symp-
tomatic of a deeper fault in the Argentine financial
system: its lack of interest in channelling funds to
technological modernization and innovation projects.
This is a crucial matter which should be addressed in
future versions of the Plan and discussed from the
angle of the NIS (see OECD, 1995).
In view of the limitations of an approach based
exclusively on  the supply of loans, as part of  the
preparation of the Plan the Industrial Institute of the
“General Sarmiento” National University has made a
diagnostic study of  demand: that is to say, of  the
technological challenges faced by small and medium-
sized industrial enterprises. As a function of this
study, and in the light of similar schemes in the in-
dustrialized countries and the Programme for Rural
Change of the Ministry of Agriculture, a Programme
for Improving the Technological Capacity of SMEs
has been proposed which seeks to facilitate the pro-
gressive development of the supply of technological
services so that they can make an effective contribu-
tion  to improving the  competitiveness  of the user
firms and to promote greater linkages between those
requiring technical services and the public and pri-
vate suppliers of such services.
In the various meetings held with small and me-
dium-sized enterprises it became clear that their de-
mands were for access to qualified information on
product and process technology, including mechani-
zation, improvements in quality, and technical stand-
ards. They also require specialized assistance on the
optimization of production processes, technologically
more complex  products, suitable materials, quality
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15 Among these are subsidies of up to 100 000 pesos for projects
involving  high  technical  risk  presented by SMEs, which must
co-finance at least 50% of the total cost of the projects.
16 The idea of “technological linkage units” (TLUs) is one of
the innovations of Law No. 23 877, inspired in theory by the NIS
approach. TLUs are defined as non-State bodies formed for the
identification, selection and formulation of R&D projects, trans-
mission of technology and technical assistance. They may or
may not be related with a public body, and their juridical status
may be that of a commercial company or a civil association.
The Science and Technology Department explicitly authorizes
the functioning of TLUs, which, in spite of their potential virtues
as means of favouring interaction between the supply and de-
mand of technology, have not played a very significant role in
practice.
assurance, conversion of their firms, and new market
and product niches. In short, they need assistance to
improve their skills and also to satisfy certain specific
training needs.
At the same time, the shortcomings in terms of
information  on the supply  of services from  public
bodies, universities, enterprises and other institutions
were highlighted. In the cases where SMEs made use
of these suppliers it became evident that the services
needed to be more flexible and better adapted to the
special conditions of these kinds of enterprises. A
demand thus arose for specialized services which not
only diagnose the technological problems of the SMEs
more effectively but also help them to find possible
solutions.
Technological advisers form the hub of the Pro-
gramme to Improve the Technological Capacity of
SMEs, which we will therefore refer to as the Techno-
logical Advisers Programme. The role of the adviser
is to enable the enterprise to evaluate its technical
capacity, identify its needs and seek the solutions and
options considered most useful. The adviser expands
the range of material available for helping to take
decisions and helps to set in motion the process of
strengthening  the firm’s capabilities. The adviser’s
job is not to overcome these shortcomings but to help
to overcome them.
The Technological Advisers Programme aims
mainly to develop a technological advisory services
market for the approximately 15 000 Argentine in-
dustrial SMEs operating in tradeable goods sectors.
Two types of advisory assistance are envisaged: insti-
tutional technological advisory assistance and indi-
vidual technological advisory assistance. In the first
case, an advisory assistance scheme will be estab-
lished on the basis of internships by young graduates
in  engineering  and other  appropriate  technological
and scientific subjects. Their participation will be or-
ganized through private and/or public non-profit-
making institutions (such as the engineering faculties
of universities) which will offer SMEs advisory sup-
port through interns stationed in each firm and super-
vised by experienced professionals.
In the second case, there will be individual ad-
visers supporting and advising a small group of enter-
prises on a personal basis. Through chambers of
industry and business associations or temporary asso-
ciations of enterprises, groups consisting of a dozen
or so SMEs will be formed which will be provided
with an exclusive adviser through a collective pro-
gramme of activities and needs. Each group will
present a programme of work when FONTAR invites
applications for advisory assistance.
The Technological Advisers  Programme will
be financed with funds made available under Law
No. 23 877 and administered by FONTAR (5.4 million
pesos in 1998), with the contributions of the
firms making use of the service, and with other
funds available to the bodies that will provide the
advisory services.
This programme is undoubtedly a good initiative
which fits in well with the NIS approach and is in-
spired by some elements of the best international
practices (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996, and OECD,
1997).
In contrast with the many programmes existing
in Argentina which are based on the supply of financ-
ing or non-financial services to individual firms, and
which generally subsidize physical investments or
working capital, the Technological Advisers Pro-
gramme has been motivated by the demands of the
production sector itself and is designed to link up
public technological institutions and universities with
groups of firms rather than individual firms. The sub-
sidy that firms can obtain in order to help pay for the
advisory services will enable the SMEs to bring
highly-qualified engineers into their staff (often for
the first time) and will help them to begin to appreci-
ate the importance of their services.
At  the same time, the Technological Advisers
Programme offers employment opportunities for
young engineers and facilitates contact with the reali-
ties of the production sector right from the start of
their professional career. It will also give an opportu-
nity to experienced professionals to establish closer
links with the specific needs of the production sector,
to supervise the work of the young graduates, and to
enrich their own work in their institutions with first-
hand information on what really takes place on the
shop floor. The fact that the advisers do not merely
visit the firms occasionally but actually participate
systematically in the activities of the firms should
make for smoother transmission and development of
tacit know-how. At the same time, an essential mis-
sion of the advisers is to facilitate the access of the
firms to  the  services of public  sector science and
technology institutions and, in turn, to cause the latter
to take more account of the specific requirements of
the production sector.
However, the difficulties that the initiation of
this programme may involve must not be underesti-
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mated. Apart from the lack of experience of FONTAR
and of the country as a whole in this type of policy
instruments, enterprises may be reluctant to partici-
pate for various reasons: reluctance to work in
groups, lack of confidence in the ability of the advis-
ers and institutions to provide good service, difficul-
ties in financing that part of the services which is not
subsidized by the State, etc. Moreover, the universi-
ties and other institutions may not be sufficiently mo-
tivated to  take  on  tasks  they are  not used to and
which will not provide significant direct benefits,
while the knowledge possessed by the young gradu-
ates may not be sufficient for the tasks involved and
the SMEs may very soon feel disappointed. Further-
more, as proposed in the Plan, the Technological Ad-
visers  Programme should interact closely with the
various other programmes already in operation for
the SMEs,17 but  this  aspiration  comes into conflict
with an existing situation which is hard to change,
marked by extensive dispersion of efforts and lack of
coordination in this field.
While some of these  initial obstacles may  be
overcome as the work proceeds and the Technologi-
cal Advisers Programme may steadily gain experi-
ence and credibility, it is necessary to bear in mind
some other types of problems that may occur in de-
mand-led mechanisms for small and medium-sized
enterprises. In an interesting study on the recent ex-
perience of the Chilean Production Development
Corporation (CORFO) in putting into effect a scheme
of this type, it is noted that the costs of gaining access
to the development system may mean that a handful
of enterprises may, by definition, have preferential
access, although these firms are the most dynamic in
their field and, in theory, have the least need of public
support. Moreover, as what is involved are tacit ac-
tivities   subject   to incomplete   specifications   and
highly imperfect transferability, it is unlikely that the
beneficiary firms will have much incentive –or even
much possibility– to pass on their own experience to
others, thus sharply reducing the externalities (Dini
and Katz, 1997).
With regard to other policy instruments for in-
centivating both large and small domestic enterprises
and subsidiaries of foreign companies to make re-
search and development efforts with their own quali-
fied personnel or under contracts with research insti-
tutions, fiscal credit amounting to 20 million pesos
has been provided for in the 1998 national budget.18
In order to try to obviate the abuses to which
these types of incentives sometimes give rise, the fis-
cal credit certificates will be awarded by competition
to the research and development projects submitted to
the Agency. These certificates can be used by their
holders to pay off future profits tax commitments, up
to a percentage which goes down according to the
size of the relevant annual tax commitment.
Inasmuch as they help to finance up to 50% of
the cost of executing projects, these public funds will
serve as an incentive for increased private expendi-
ture on R&D. Thus, it is estimated that this fiscal
credit will generate an additional private sector con-
tribution of some 30 million pesos.
With this fiscal credit, Argentina is placing itself
on the same footing as many other countries –espe-
cially Brazil, for example– which use this instrument,
accepted by the World Trade Organization, to encour-
age the private sector to make research and develop-
ment efforts. Unlike the financial incentives which
are designed primarily to help SMEs, this fiscal credit
will not only be useful for those firms which have tax
obligations but will undoubtedly also be of interest to
large enterprises in general.
According to the available estimates, private sec-
tor expenditure on R&D in 1996 came to 369 million
pesos, so that the impact the fiscal credit may have on
private sector behaviour is quite small and will prob-
ably only benefit large companies which already en-
gage in activities of this type. At all events, this credit
can become an incentive for firms to do more in this
area –as is shown by the recent experience of Brazil
in the implementation of Law No. 8661/93– and thus
have multiplier effects.
While not denying the importance of a stable
macro economy and high growth rates, and while ac-
knowledging the value of the financial and fiscal in-
centives, the research and development projects
financed by FONCYT, and the Programme to Improve
the Technological Capacity of SMEs, there can be no
doubt that this context and these instruments are
nothing like big enough to bring about a substantial
change in the behaviour of large or small firms in
technological matters.
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17 The corresponding part of the Plan lists 31 existing instru-
ments directed towards the SMEs, of which 13 are closely linked
with the Technological Advisers Programme.
18 In reality, this represents the  fulfillment  of  an outstanding
task: adoption of the regulations for the fiscal credit provided for
in article 9 of Law No. 23 877.
In order to cope with the change in the rules of
the game involved in competing in economies which
are more open to international trade and to the entry
of new competitors, the surviving enterprises have
generally redoubled their technological efforts to gain
efficiency and secure improvements in productivity
and quality. However, this process has been very het-
erogeneous as regards the activities involved, the size
of the firms, and their geographical location.
While most of the SMEs which have survived
have done so by trying to improve their productivity
and quality, a considerable number of firms (espe-
cially big companies) have not only invested in im-
ported capital goods but have also made use of
licenses or technical assistance from abroad or have
been bought out by foreign investors. At the same
time, these firms have presumably also made efforts
to absorb the technologies received from the exterior
and to  adapt them and make some innovations in
products and processes. However, the information
available for analysing this complex process of “crea-
tive destruction” is very fragmentary and only pro-
vides evidence of this phenomenon in some foreign-
owned firms and large domestic enterprises.
At the beginning of the 1990s, a group of 39
subsidiaries of transnational corporations operating in
various industrial sectors registered average R&D ex-
penditure equivalent to around 1% of their sales
(Kosacoff and Bezchinsky, 1993), which is rather
higher than the level estimated for the Argentine
manufacturing sector as a whole. Our studies on FDI
have revealed that endogenous efforts in the subsidi-
aries are concentrated on staff training and improve-
ments in quality and productivity. Of the privatized
enterprises, only one of the telephone companies
maintains a research and development laboratory, not
linked to that of the parent company, for operational
reasons. In the manufacturing firms, the biggest ef-
forts in this field (generally equivalent to less than
1% of sales) were found in the manufacturers of tele-
communications equipment and some firms in the
food industry engaged in the export of staple goods
(Chudnovsky, Porta, López and Chidiak, 1996).
Likewise, significant efforts to improve the tech-
nological training of suppliers are only to be found in
the motor industry, where in many cases they have
involved the acquisition of local automobile compo-
nent firms by foreign companies. The technological
externalities generated by the presence of  transna-
tional corporations appear to be only weak, in view
of the small scale of innovative activities in the sub-
sidiaries and the scanty technological linkages of
these firms with local suppliers or research institutes.
In the pharmaceutical sector, significant research
and development efforts have been made by some
local firms. In other areas of activity, the expenditure
of these firms is similar to or less than that of the
subsidiaries of transnational corporations. In the few
economic conglomerates which engage in activities
of this type, their expenditure is equivalent to less
than 1% of their sales. As long as strategic alliances
with  international corporations continue  to be fre-
quent in these conglomerates it is doubtful that there
will be many agreements giving priority to techno-
logical innovation activities. However, this is a mat-
ter which calls for greater study.
The fact that the private sector spends little on
R&D is partly a consequence of the type of branches
in  which production investment  is concentrated in
Argentina. These are generally activities which are
based on natural resources or in which economies of
scale are important, and in which R&D expenditure
is not very high at the international level either. The
same is true, at the international level, of the activi-
ties in which the privatization operations have been
concentrated (water, electricity, gas, petroleum). Only
the telecommunications sector makes intensive use of
R&D, but not in Argentina.
However, the backward or forward linkages of
the sectors in which investments have been concen-
trated could give rise to activities making intensive
use of knowledge; moreover, some segments of the
specialized machinery and equipment industry could
be revitalized, along with some activities based on
the country’s stock of scientific personnel.
It is possible that domestic and foreign enter-
prises may slowly and spontaneously increase their
innovative activities and even invest in knowledge-
intensive branches. In this case, it could be argued that,
in addition to a growing macro economy and the hori-
zontal instruments mentioned earlier, laissez-faire
would be the most suitable policy for the private sector.
If  it is  considered, however, that  this process
should be deliberately accelerated and that such ac-
tivities should be promoted through specific policies,
it does not seem possible to ignore the sectoral con-
text, for that is precisely where the weaknesses of the
new science and technology policy make themselves
felt. Only in the case of mining, where there is a
well-defined sectoral policy, and food and agricul-
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tural production, where an effort to define policy
lines is beginning to be made, is the technological
variable being explicitly incorporated in sectoral dy-
namics.
In the rest of manufacturing, in contrast, the
technology variable has been absent from the deci-
sions that  the national government has taken with
regard to schemes to permit the adaptation of various
industrial sectors within MERCOSUR and the treatment
given to the local machinery and equipment indus-
try.19 In the scheme for the motor industry, the tran-
snational corporations and/or their local licensees
have been allowed to act in matters of technology
according to their own interests, without trying to
obtain too many externalities with regard to the de-
velopment of suppliers, environmental management,
staff training and links with technological institutes.20
As we noted earlier, in sectors which are of cru-
cial importance for the NIS such as health, education
and the environment the question of science and tech-
nology is mentioned in rhetorical rather than effective
terms in the policies indicated in the Plan.
While the government’s efforts to promote tradi-
tional activities based on natural resources –such as
mining, agroindustry, gas and petroleum– are clear
for all to see, there is a conspicuous absence of initia-
tives designed to promote knowledge-intensive ac-
tivities (except those outlined in the Plan in the area




In a stable and growing economy, the reorganization
of the science and technology sector, tardy but never-
theless finally under way, and the concepts, diagno-
ses and horizontal policies set forth in the Plan are
undoubtedly positive elements.
Inasmuch as it centers much of public policy on
the promotion of interactions between supply and de-
mand, between the public and private sectors, be-
tween science and technology institutions and users,
between inputs from abroad and local efforts, and
between provincial activities and national priorities,
the Plan is clearly inspired by the NIS approach.
By increasing financing and at the same time
beginning to change the rules for allocating public
resources to research (establishment of the Agency,
with competitive allocation of funds and evaluation
by peers); by promoting strategic plans and appraisal
mechanisms in the public science and technology
bodies; and by trying to establish some priorities in
the allocation of funds, such public policy fosters in-
stitutional changes which can invigorate the anaemic
scientific and technological complex and begin to re-
duce its most obvious systemic flaws.
Likewise, by introducing fiscal credit for R&D
and trying to link up the financial incentives more
effectively with the prevailing technological modern-
ization process, and above all by launching the Tech-
nological Advisers Programme, the Plan seeks to
give better attention to the requirements of the SMEs
and to begin to reverse the reluctance of enterprises
to make investments in technological innovation to
complement the massive inflow of inputs from
abroad.
Unfortunately, these horizontal policies are only
matched by adequate sectoral efforts in the case of
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19 In order to favour the investment process and the technologi-
cal modernization of users, in 1993 it was decided to apply a
zero tariff to imported capital goods and to compensate local
manufacturers through a subsidy to purchasers of their equip-
ment equal to the value of the tariff forgone. Apart from the
delay  in granting the relevant subsidy, which aggravated still
further this sector’s difficulties in adapting to the new rules of
the game, the question of the technological development poten-
tial of the local capital goods industry was totally absent from
government policy. As from 1995 the tariffs on the capital goods
sector were raised within the convergence operations agreed in
MERCOSUR, but there continues to be no specific policy for such
an important sector in the NIS.
20 In 1994 the Ministry of Industry launched an interesting Sup-
plier Development Programme, which, however, for reasons that
are worth investigating, does not seem to have been a success.
the mining sector and, possibly, food and agricultural
production. They are far from being adequately com-
plemented by sectoral efforts in the rest of manufac-
turing, health, education and the environment.
This brings us to the most obvious negative as-
pects that militate against the objectives and policies
of the Plan. The flaws which exist in Argentina with
regard to the ability of the financial system to finance
long-term investments in intangible assets, the inade-
quate capability of the educational system to link up
with the needs of the production sector, and the lim-
ited capability of the scientific institutions to interact
with the educational and production systems are ex-
tremely deep-seated. These flaws are mentioned in
the Plan, but they are far from receiving the attention
needed in order to begin to correct them.
Although GACTEC seems to be a good institu-
tional solution for tackling the cross-sectional prob-
lems displayed by science and technology policy, it is
still far from functioning as a means of coordinating
science and technology policy with sectoral policies,
and still further from designing a long-term vision to
guide investment efforts in tangible and intangible
assets and in the training of human resources in the
country. For this purpose, it would be necessary, at
the very least, for the level of commitment to scien-
tific and technological problems displayed in the cur-
rent actions of the Department of Science and
Technology to be repeated in the other ministries and
departments involved.
However, the public discussion of the Plan, in
which a thousand or more persons have participated
in various workshops and seminars, has enriched its
final version, and it may be expected that in the suc-
cessive annual reviews it will be further perfected
and some of its shortcomings will begin to be cor-
rected. Nevertheless, time is obviously needed in or-
der for the effects of the changes in the rules and
proposed policies to make themselves felt.
At all events, caution is called for in trying to
predict the effect that the present policies may have
in terms of reversing the crisis that affects the public
sector in this field and changing the patterns of be-
haviour of the private sector.
In Argentina, the long and frustrating history
of science and technology policies registers more
failures than successes, whereas the  laissez-faire
approach of the 1990s has been partly successful and
is supported by most of local and foreign big busi-
ness. Both of these are weighty factors that militate
against the success of the initiatives under way. At
the same time, in spite of   its very interesting pro-
posals, the NIS approach displays profound normative
and conceptual ambiguities which limit its practical
application.
In these circumstances, the merely incipient level
of commitment to the science and technology issue in
the national cabinet reflects long-standing problems
in the country. In civil society, and particularly in the
productive sectors, there is little awareness of how
important the contribution of science and technology
may be for the country’s economic and social devel-
opment. In the big domestic and foreign firms, much
more importance is attached to inputs from abroad
than to endogenous efforts that go beyond the need to
ensure the proper management of production facili-
ties and the quality of the goods produced. Likewise,
society and the production sectors set little store by
the activities of  Argentine scientists and technolo-
gists. Nor indeed have the latter made much of an
effort  in  general to  link up their research projects
with the far-reaching and changing needs of the
country.
In spite of the structural limits facing the present
policies, the diagnosis of the Argentine situation in
this field will be more accurate and the possibilities
of improving and broadening the corresponding pub-
lic policies will be increased if, through future re-
search, a number of questions can begin to be
answered:
First, it is necessary to follow up and analyse
with close attention the way that the initiatives al-
ready launched are being put into practice, especially
with regard to the reorganization of the science and
technology bodies, the management of the competi-
tive funds administered by FONCYT, fiscal credit, and
the FONTAR Technological Advisers Programme, and
the policies in the fields of mining and food and agri-
cultural production.
Second, the results of the survey on the techno-
logical conduct of Argentine industrial companies
will make it possible to analyse the size and nature of
the innovation efforts of the private sector (both
small and medium-sized enterprises and big domestic
and foreign firms) and to determine to what extent
the various inputs from abroad complement local ef-
forts in various branches of manufacturing. It will
also be important to study the kind of interactions
firms have been establishing in the country with the
various local and foreign agents and institutions.
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Third, the potential for the development of
knowledge-intensive activities in Argentina is worth
studying in depth, together with the feasibility of ap-
plying policies like those followed in other countries
to promote this kind of activities (enterprise brooders,
innovation parks, etc.).
Fourth, it is necessary to examine the faults in
the Argentine financial system and the possibility of
correcting them in order to promote greater availabil-
ity of financing for intangible activities.
Lastly, the problems faced by higher and techni-
cal education and its possibilities of training the hu-
man resources needed by the NIS represent a vital
issue which has not yet been addressed in the necessary
depth. The training of human resources for an economy
increasingly based on knowledge calls for detailed stud-
ies not only of supply but also of demand, as a func-
tion of medium- and long-term scenarios for the
country’s economic and social development.
(Original: Spanish)
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